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I. FIRST PRINCIPLES
The Declaration of Independence opens with the following memorable
passage:
When in the Course of human Events, it becomes necessary for
one People to dissolve the Political Bands which have connected them
with another, and to assume among the Powers of the Earth, the
separate and equal Station to which the Laws of Nature and of
Nature's God entitle them, a decent Respect to the Opinions of
Mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel
them to the Separation.'
As Professor Louis Henkin has noted, the early architects of our Nation
understood that the customs of nations-the global opinions of
mankind-would be binding upon the newly forged union.- John Jay, the first
Chief Justice of the United States, observed in Chisoin v. Georgia that the
United States "had, by taking a place among the nations of the earth, become
amenable to the laws of nations." 3 Although the Constitution gives Congress
the power to "define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations"'
and identifies treaties as part of "the supreme Law of the Land,"5 the task of
further defining the role of international law in the nation's legal fabric has
fallen to the federal courts.
Several first principles have been established. As early as 1804, in Murray
v. Schooner Charming Betsy, the Supreme Court recognized that "an act of
congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
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possible construction remains."6 In a trilogy of cases in the 1880's, the Court
established that treaties are on equal footing with federal statutes and that,
where a treaty and statute cannot be reconciled, the later in time is
controlling.7 Finally, in the case of The Paquete Habana,' decided in 1900,
the Supreme Court addressed the ability of courts to enforce customary
international law. In invalidating the wartime seizure of private fishing vessels
as contrary to the law of nations, the Court observed: "International law is part
of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts ....
[W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized
nations . . . .9 Although commentators continue to debate the extent of
executive, legislative, or judicial power to trump customary international law,
the import of The Paquete Habana is clear: Customary international law
informs the construction of domestic law, and, at least in the absence of any
superseding positive law, is controlling.
The Paquete Habana left many questions unanswered, and courts since
have backed away from some of that decision's more sweeping promises. The
principles established during the Supreme Court's first century, however,
continue to define the relationship between the law of nations and domestic
American law. This Article considers the Supreme Court's application of these
principles in four recent cases. The first two, United States v. Alvarez-
Machaint' and Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.," required the Court
to examine the validity of executive action in light of binding international
treaties. The last two, Thompson v. Oklahoma 2 and Stanford v. Kentucky, 3
addressed the implications of international law for Eighth Amendment death-
penalty jurisprudence. Unfortunately, I conclude from these cases that the
Supreme Court recently has shown something less than "a decent respect to the
opinions of mankind."
II. CONSTRUING INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
A. United States v. Alvarez-Machain
Two Terms ago, in the case of United States v. Alvarez-Machain, the
Supreme Court was asked to consider whether the forced abduction of a
6. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
7. See Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 597-99 (1884); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194
(1888); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600, 602-03 (1889).
8. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
9. Id. at 700.
10. 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
11. 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
12. 487 U.S. 815 (1987).
13. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
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Mexican national by United States agents violated a U.S.-Mexico extradition
treaty. 4  Over the vehement protest of the Mexican government,
Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain was kidnaped in Mexico and brought to the
United States to stand charges for the kidnaping, torture, and murder of a U.S.
Drug Enforcement Administration agent. The district court dismissed the
charges, concluding that the abduction violated the U.S.-Mexico extradition
treaty. '
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding, by a 6-3 vote, that the abduction
had not violated the extradition treaty. Although the treaty established
comprehensive procedures for the extradition of foreign nationals wanted for
prosecution by the other sovereign, Chief Justice Rehnquist observed for the
majority that the treaty was silent with regard to "the obligations of the United
States and Mexico to refrain from forcible abductions of people from the
territory of the other nation."16 In the absence of an express prohibition, the
majority reasoned, the kidnaping must be allowed. Ignoring the hornbook
principle that a treaty shall be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning
and in light of its object and purpose, the majority rejected the contention that
its interpretation would eviscerate the treaty's purpose," even while
acknowledging that the abduction "may be in violation of general international
law principles."''8
Justice Stevens condemned the Court's holding in a dissent in which
Justice O'Connor and I joined. The dissenters argued that construing the
treaty's silence to allow kidnaping would reduce its provisions to mere
"verbiage"' 9 and would violate the treaty's spirit and purpose. Extradition
treaties codify fundamental international norms. They preserve the territorial
integrity of nations, protect individuals from arbitrary detention and arrest, and
prevent international conflict. Transborder kidnaping, of course, violates each
of these overarching goals. The Supreme Court, it seems to me, thus construed
the treaty to permit the precise result that the document was drafted to forbid.
In so doing, the Supreme Court also ignored customary international law.
Quoting an article by Professor Henkin, the dissenting opinion observed that
with or without an extradition treaty, abducting a person from a foreign
country without the foreign government's consent "'is a gross violation of
international law and gross disrespect for a norm high in the opinion of
mankind. It is a blatant violation of the territorial integrity of another state;
[and] it eviscerates the [global] extradition system."'2' Even with the consent
14. See Extradition Treaty, May 4. 1978, U.S.-Mex.. 31 U S.T. 5059.
15. United States v. Caro-Quintero. 745 F. Supp. 599 (CD Cal. 1990).
16. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193.
17. See id. at 2194.
18. Id. at 2196.
19. Id. at 2198 (Stevens. J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 2202 (quoting Henkin. supra note 2. at 231) (alteration in onginal)
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of the foreign sovereign, kidnaping a foreign national flagrantly violates
peremptory human rights norms. Ironically, in its construction of the treaty, the
Supreme Court could have benefited from the example of the highest court of
South Africa, which recently dismissed the prosecution of a person kidnaped
from a neighboring country. In language strikingly reminiscent of that in The
Paquete Habana, the court concluded that an "'abduction represents a violation
of the applicable rules of international law, that these rules are part of [South
African] law, and that this violation of the law deprive[d] the Court ... of its
competence to hear [the] case."''
The Alvarez-Machain chapter in the Supreme Court's history closed with
a poetic twist. In December 1992, the district court dismissed the criminal
charges against Dr. Alvarez-Machain, concluding that the government's
evidence supporting the indictment was insufficient
22
In my view, the Supreme Court's Alvarez-Machain decision did
tremendous damage to the fabric of both conventional and customary
international law. If the Supreme Court's holding was correct and the
abduction of Dr. Alvarez-Machain was consistent with the extradition treaty,
then the treaty constrains Mexico from kidnaping U.S. nationals no more than
it constrains the United States. Similarly, according to the Court's reasoning,
rather than negotiating for the extradition of John Demjanjuk, Israel could have
kidnaped him and held him for trial on any charges it wished. The Court's
interpretation thus would subvert the entire purpose of the global extradition
system.
We perhaps can take some comfort in the fact that although the Supreme
Court is the highest court in the land, its rulings are not necessarily the final
word on questions of international law. The Alvarez-Machain decision
provoked domestic and international outcry and was deemed by the Inter-
American Juridical Committee to be "contrary to the rules of international
law."23 And the decision and its aftermath inspired a searching re-
examination, in both Congress and the Justice Department, of the
Government's kidnaping policy.24 In June 1993, the United States and Mexico
formally agreed to negotiate a ban on the practice of transborder kidnaping.?3
Thus, as is often the case, it appears to have taken a troublesome Supreme
21. Id. at 2206 n.36 (quoting State v. Ebrahim, [1991] 2 S. Afr. L. Rep. 553, 568) (alternate translation
in 31 I.L.M. 888 (1992)).
22. Seth Mydans, Judge Clears Mexican in Agent's Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1992, at A20.
23. Legal Opinion on the Decision of the Supreme Court of the United States of America, CJI/Rcs.
11-15/92, Inter-Am. Juridical Comm., OEA/ser. G/CP/doc. 2302/92 (Sept. I, 1992), reprinted in 4 CRItl.
L.F. 119 (1993).
24. See Kidnapping Suspects Abroad: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); Paul Hoffman, U.S. Must Not
Kidnap Suspects Abroad, NEWSDAY, Dec. 2, 1993, at 114 (noting internal Justice Department review
ordered by Attorney General Janet Reno in response to Alvarez-Machain).
25. Steven A. Holmes, U.S. Gives Mexico Abduction Pledge, N.Y. TIMES, June 22. 1993, at Al l.
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Court decision to launch the process of bringing domestic law in line with
international practice.
B. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.
Last Term, the Supreme Court again was called upon to construe an
international treaty, with equally disturbing results for the opinions of mankind.
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.2 6 concerned a challenge by Haitian
refugees to the U.S. policy of interdicting all Haitians who fled Haiti on the
high seas and summarily returning them to Haiti, without any inquiry into their
asylum claims or even their intended destination. Central to the Haitian
plaintiffs' challenge was Article 33.1 of the United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees. That Article provides: "No Contracting
State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to
the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened." '
The principle of nonrefoulenent expressed in Article 33.1-that no refugee
may be returned to a country where he will suffer persecution-guarantees one
of the most fundamental international rights of refugees. More than 120
nations, including the United States, have acceded to the binding obligations
of Article 33.1.28 In 1980, Congress adopted § 243(h) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act,2 9 which mirrors the language of Article 33.1, in order to
bring U.S. law expressly into compliance with the Refugee Convention.
In construing § 243(h) and Article 33.1 in Haitian Centers Council, the
Court once again failed to respect its first principles of international law.
Turning first to the statute, the Court remarkably applied a presumption against
extraterritoriality to § 243(h) without considering the fact that the statute was
enacted pursuant to a multilateral treaty, and without acknowledging the
primacy of the principle of nonrefoulement in customary international law."'
The Court thus ignored a maxim recognized since Schooner Charming Betsy:
An Act of Congress-and particularly a statute enacted pursuant to a
treaty-ought never to be construed to violate a coextensive treaty or otherwise
to contradict customary international law.
Having established that § 243(h) does not apply beyond U.S. borders, the
Court then reasoned backwards to construe the language of Article 33.1-a
global convention-in light of its interpretation of American immigration law.
The language of Article 33.1 absolutely prohibits the "return" of any refugee
26. 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
27. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. JuIl 28. 1951. art 33 I. 19 t' S T 6259. 6276. 189
U.N.T.S. 150, 176, as incorporated in Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugee%. Jan 31. 1967. 19 V" ST
6223. 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
28. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE. TREATIES IN FORCE 399-400 (1994).
29. Refugee Act of 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-212. § 203(c). 94 Stat 107 (codified as amended at 8 U S C
§ 1253(h) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
30. See Haitian Ctrs. Council. 113 S. Ct. at 2563.
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"in any manner whatsoever," without geographical limitation.3 The Supreme
Court nevertheless concluded that the prohibition applies only after a refugee
successfully enters U.S. territory.32 Neither the treaty nor the statute,
therefore, prevents the United States from reaching outside its territory to
exercise jurisdiction over bona fide refugees in international waters.33
Writing this time for the 8-1 majority, Justice Stevens conceded that "It]he
drafters of the Convention ... may not have contemplated that any nation
would gather fleeing refugees and return them to the one country they had
desperately sought to escape." 34 "[S]uch actions," the Court acknowledged,
"may even violate the spirit of Article 33. 3' Nevertheless,' the Court
concluded that "[b]ecause the text of Article 33 cannot reasonably be read to
say anything at all about a nation's actions toward aliens outside its own
territory, it does not prohibit such actions. ' '36 The Court thus accomplished
precisely what Justice Stevens' dissent had so vehemently criticized in Alvarez-
Machain the Term before. Once again, the Court interpreted a treaty contrary
to its plain meaning, spirit, and purpose, and contrary to the tenets of
customary international law.
I was the sole dissenter in Haitian Centers Council. Although I shall not
belabor the argument, to me the mandate and spirit of the Refugee Convention
are clear: "Vulnerable refugees shall not be returned., 37 Article 33.1 forbids
nations from returning any refugee to a territory where he will suffer
persecution. This, of course, is precisely what the Government did when it
interdicted and forcibly returned Haitian refugees.
In the conclusion to my dissent, I noted that Article 33.1 was drafted
largely in response to the experience of Jewish refugees during World
War II-refugees the United States and nations of Europe repelled and
returned to the gas chambers of Nazi Germany. Article 33.1 was meant to
ensure that this international nightmare would not be repeated.38 To allow
nations to skirt their solemn treaty obligations and return vulnerable refugees
to persecution simply by intercepting them in international waters is, as the
district court in Haitian Centers Council noted, to turn the Refugee Convention
into a "cruel hoax.
39
As in the Alvarez-Machain case, the Haitian Centers Council decision was
not the final chapter in domestic compliance with Article 33.1 or in the plight
31. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 27, 19 U.S.T. at 6276, 189 U.N.TS.
at 176.
32. 113 S. Ct. at 2564, 2565-66.
33. Id. at 2567.
34. Id. at 2565.
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 2568 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 2577.
39. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, No. 92-CV1258, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8452, at *5
(E.D.N.Y June 5, 1992).
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of the Haitian refugees. The political reverberations have been mixed. The
decision immediately was invoked in some circles to justify the return of
undocumented Chinese immigrants interdicted outside U.S. territorial waters,
and the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel recently relied on the
decision to conclude that refugees interdicted in United States waters enjoy no
protection against refouleinent.4 ° But the Haitian Centers Council litigation
also stirred domestic protest and prompted the filing of a petition challenging
the United States policy before the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights.4 In May 1994, President Clinton finally vindicated the Haitian
plaintiffs by terminating the policy, conceding that the United States was
returning bona fide refugees to torture at the hands of the Haitian military. 2
While we may celebrate these positive steps toward reconciling United States
practice with international law, I regret that they were necessary to counter the
Supreme Court's disregard for clear principles of international law.
Do not the decisions in the Alvarez-Machain and Haitian Centers Council
cases reflect a disturbing disregard on the part of the Supreme Court of its
obligations when construing international law? Treaties are contracts among
nations and thus must be interpreted with sensitivity toward the customs of the
world community. In each of these cases, however, the Court ignored its first
principles and construed the challenged treaty in a manner directly contrary to
the opinions of mankind.
III. RESPECT FOR THE LAW OF NATIONS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Although questions of international law typically arise before the Court in
cases involving the construction of international conventions, the law of
nations is implicated in Supreme Court jurisprudence in other situations as
well. International law can and should inform the interpretation of various
clauses of the Constitution, notably the Due Process Clause and the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. I thus turn to
a second area where the Court has failed to inform its decisions with a "decent
respect to the opinions of mankind": the execution of juvenile offenders.
For nearly half a century, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the
Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause "must draw its
meaning from evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society." 3 The drafters of the Amendment were concerned, at root,
40. Memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel. U.S Department of Justicc. to the Attorney
General (Oct. 13, 1993).
41. See Petitioners Release Resolution of the Inter-American Comninission on Htuman Rights
Concerning U.S. Program of Haitian Refutgee Interdiction. 32 I.LM. 1215, 1216 (993)
42. See Remarks Announcing William H. Gray 111 as Special Adv iser on Ilaitt. 30 WEKLY COIP
PRES. Doc. 1010 (May 8. 1994).
43. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinionl
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with "the dignity of man,"'  and understood that "evolving standards of
decency" should be measured, in part, against international norms. Thus, in
cases striking down the death penalty as a punishment for rape45 or for
unintentional killings,46 the Court has looked to both domestic custom and the
"climate of international opinion" to determine what punishments are cruel and
unusual.47
Taking international law seriously where the death penalty is concerned,
of course, draws into question the United States' entire capital punishment
enterprise. According to Amnesty International, more than fifty countries
(including almost all of Western Europe) have abolished the death penalty
entirely, and thirty-seven others either have ceased imposing it or have limited
its imposition to extraordinary crimes.4" Even those countries that continue
to impose the death penalty almost universally condemn the execution of
juvenile offenders. 49 They do so in recognition of the fact that juveniles are
too young, and too capable of growth and development, to act with the
culpability necessary to justify society's ultimate punishment. The United
States, however, persistently has defended its "right" to sentence juvenile
offenders to death.
Challenges to the execution of juvenile offenders came to the Court twice
in the late 1980's. In 1987, the Court considered the constitutionality of the
death sentence of William Wayne Thompson, imposed by an Oklahoma court
for a crime Thompson committed at the age of fifteen. 50 A plurality of four,
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and I concluded that the "civilized
standards of decency" embodied in the Eighth Amendment prohibited
Thompson's execution.5 We observed that states that had considered the
issue universally limited capital punishment to defendants age sixteen or older
at the time of the offense.52 Writing for the plurality, Justice Stevens noted
that this conclusion was consistent with international practice, since the
execution of minors was prohibited by the~nations of Western Europe53 and
by the Soviet Union. 54 Both the plurality and Justice O'Connor's concurrence
found it significant that three major international human rights treaties
44. Id. at 100.
45. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
46. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
47. Coker, 433 U.S. at 596 n.10.
48. See INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT, AMNESTY INT'L, THE DEATH PENALTY: LIST OF ABOLITIONIST
AND RETENTIONIST COUNTRIES 1 (1994).
49. See INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT, AMNESTY INT'L, OPEN LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT ON TILE
DEATH PENALTY 8 (1994) [hereinafter OPEN LETTER].
50. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1987) (plurality opinion).
51. Id. at 830, 838.
52. Id. at 829 n.30.
53. Id. at 830.
54. Id. at 831.
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explicitly prohibited juvenile death penalties" and that one of these
instruments-Article 68 of the Geneva Convention-had been ratified by the
United States.56
In a dissent joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White, Justice
Scalia denounced as "totally inappropriate" the plurality's reliance on
international practice. "(Tihe views of other nations, however enlightened the
Justices of this Court may think them to be," Justice Scalia argued, "cannot be
imposed upon Americans through the Constitution."' 7 Justice Scalia's view
that international practice is irrelevant to construction of the Eighth
Amendment is ironic for an originalist, given that the drafters of the
Constitution necessarily referred to foreign, rather than American, norms at the
time it was adopted. Justice Scalia's position did not prevail, however, and
today Thompson v. Oklahoma stands for the proposition that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the execution of fifteen-year-old offenders.
Two Terms later, the same question returned to the Court in cases
involving juveniles sentenced to death for crimes they committed at the age of
sixteen or older. This time a different conception of the Eighth Amendment
prevailed. In a 5-4 majority opinion, the Supreme Court held in Stanford v.
Kentucky58 that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the execution of
juveniles for crimes committed at age sixteen. Now writing for the majority,
Justice Scalia emphasized that "it is American conceptions of decency that are
dispositive," and rejected the contention of the petitioners and their amici that
the juvenile sentencing practices of other countries were relevant."9
Justice Brennan wrote the dissent for the four members of the Thompson
plurality. Arguing that the Court consistently has recognized "that objective
indicators of contemporary standards of decency in the form of legislation in
other countries is also of relevance to Eighth Amendment analysis," Justice
Brennan observed that "[wlithin the world community, the imposition of the
death penalty for juvenile crimes appears to be overvhelmingly
disapproved.'
Justice Brennan was correct. As Amnesty International has reported, the
United States "stands almost alone in the world in still executing offenders
55. See American Convention on Human Rights, pened for signature No% 22. 1969. an 45),
OEA/ser. K/XVI/I.I, doc. 65. rev. I. corr. 2 (1970) (entered into force July IS. 1978). International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. opened for sgnature Dec. 19. 1966. art 65, 999 U N TS 171.
175 (entered into force March 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPRI: Genesa Consention Rclati'c to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War. opened for signature Aug 12, 1949. art. 68. 6 U S T 3516. 3560. 75
U.N.T.S. 287. 330 (entered into force Oct. 21. 1950),
56. 487 U.S. at 831 n.34: id. at 851 (O'Connor. J.. concurrng)
57. Id. at 868 n.4 (Scalia. J., dissenting).
58. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
59. Id. at 369 n.1.
60. Id. at 389 (Brennan. J.. dissenting).
61. Id. at 390.
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who were under-18 at the time of the crime."62 There can be no question that
the law of nations prohibits the execution of juvenile offenders. At least
seventy-two of the countries that retain the death penalty prohibit the execution
of persons under eighteen at the time of the offense.63 Global conventions
such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which over
125 nations have acceded," forbid the death penalty for offenses committed
by juveniles under eighteen.65 In the decade preceding the Stanford decision,
only eight juvenile offenders had been executed worldwide. Three of these
executions occurred in the United States.66 Since 1984, nine juvenile
offenders have been executed in the United States alone, 67 and, as of October
1993, at least thirty-one condemned juveniles were on America's death
rows. 68 These figures have led Amnesty International to conclude that the
United States has carried out more executions of juvenile offenders and has
more juvenile offenders on death row than perhaps any other nation. 69 Rather
than trying to reconcile the dissonance between domestic and international
practice, however, the Supreme Court's recent decisions have exacerbated it.
In a 5-4 decision last term, the Supreme Court upheld a law allowing Texas
courts to sentence juvenile offenders to death without ever instructing the jury
to consider the defendant's age as a circumstance mitigating against death.7"
Refusing to consider international practice in construing the Eighth
Amendment is convenient for a Court that wishes to avoid conflict between the
death penalty and the Constitution. But it is not consistent with this Court's
established construction of the Eighth Amendment. If the substance of the
Eighth Amendment is to turn on the "evolving standards of decency" of the
civilized world, there can be no justification for limiting judicial inquiry to the
opinions of the United States. Under the principles set forth in The Paquete
Habana, interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, no less than interpretations
of treaties and statutes, should be informed by a decent respect for the global
opinions of mankind.
62. OPEN LETrER, supra note 49, at 8.
63. Id. at 8 n.10
64. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 28, at 350.
65. ICCPR, supra note 55, art. 6(5), 999 U.N.T.S. at 175.
66. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 389 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for Amnesty International as
Amicus Curiae at 6, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1987) (No. 86-6169)).
67. INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT, AMNESTY INT'L, UN MEMBER STATES AND THEIR POSITIONS ON
THE DEATH PENALTY FOR CRIMES COMMITrED BY PERSONS BELOW 18 YEARS OF AGE (1994).
68. OPEN LETTER, supra note 49, at 8 n.l .
69. Id. at 8.
70. See Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658, 2672 (1993). Although I have focused here on the
execution of juvenile offenders, my argument applies more broadly to the Court's death-penalty
jurisprudence. See Campbell v. Wood, 114 S. Ct. 2125, 2126 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (arguing that state-sponsored hanging violates evolving standards of decency; noting that "the
only three jurisdictions in the English-speaking world that impose state-sponsored hangings are Washington,
Montana, and South Africa"); Wills v. Texas, 114 S. Ct. 1867, 1868 n.2 (1994) (Blackmun, I., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (arguing that execution of mentally retarded juvenile offenders violates evolving
standards of decency).
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The Supreme Court's recent death-penalty decisions have not provoked a
political response similar to that following the Alvarez-Machain and Haitian
Centers Council decisions. No doubt this political recalcitrance is due in part
to the country's current romance with the death penalty. I am confident,
however, that at some point the courts and the country will come to appreciate
that the execution of juvenile offenders-and the imposition of the death
penalty generally-is no more tolerable than other violations of international
law.
IV. CONCLUSION
Professor Henkin poignantly has observed that "almost all nations observe
almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations
almost all of the time."7' Unfortunately, as the cases I have discussed
illustrate, the Supreme Court's own recent record in the area is somewhat more
qualified. At best, I would say that the present Supreme Court enforces some
principles of international law and some of its obligations some of the time.
The reasons for the Court's failures in this area are not very clear.
Concerns about separation of powers and judicial competence often make
courts reluctant to second-guess other branches of government in areas
involving international affairs. Modem jurists also are notably lacking in the
diplomatic experience of early Justices such as John Jay and John Marshall,
who were familiar with the law of nations and comfortable navigating by it.
Never before, however, has an understanding of international law been
more important. During my thirty-four years of service on the federal bench,
the United States has become economically and politically intertwined with the
rest of the world as never before. International human rights conventions-still
a relatively new idea when I came to the bench in 1959-have created mutual
obligations that are accepted throughout the world. As we approach the 100th
anniversary of The Paquete Habana, then, it perhaps is appropriate to remind
ourselves that the United States is part of the global community, that
"[i]nternational law is part of our law," and that courts should construe our
statutes, our treaties, and our Constitution, where possible, consistently with
"the customs and usages of civilized nations. '72 Although the recent decisions
of the Supreme Court do not offer much hope for the immediate future, I look
forward to the day when the majority of the Supreme Court will inform almost
all of its decisions almost all of the time with a decent respect to the opinions
of mankind.
71. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979)
72. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (emphasis added).
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